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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to advance theoretical understanding of the
important role of both power and negotiation during online deception. By so
doing, the paper provides insight into the relationship between perpetrator and
victim in Internet fraud. The growing prevalence of Internet Fraud continues to
be a burden to both society and individuals. In an attempt to better understand
Internet fraud and online deception, this article attempts to build an interactive
model, based upon the dimensions of power and negotiation from the
management and psychology literature. Using the model presented, the article
examines the effects of the Internet on the communication process that takes
place between perpetrator and victim. Finally, the article discusses some of the
major tactics employed to appeal to each power type in predominant fraud
forms, as well exploring future types of fraud.
Keywords: Internet, fraud, cybercrime, power, negotiation, deception
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, the subject of fraud has received substantial
attention in nearly all fields of management. Frauds such as Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia have resulted in a mistrust of the United States
accounting standards and profession, causing accounting rule makers and
government regulators to reevaluate and reestablish basic accounting
*
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procedures (Apostolon and Crumbley, 2005). Large frauds around the world
such as Parmalat, Harris Scarfe, HIH, Royal Ahold and SK Global show that
these disasters are not just occurring in the United States, but are prevalent
throughout the world. One conservative estimate suggests that organizations in
the United States lose more than six percent of their total revenue as a result of
various types of fraud (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2004).
As described above, fraud has a large impact on society. However, in the last
few years, as a result of technology and the explosive growth of the Internet
and e-commerce, Internet fraud has become a major concern for consumers,
merchants, and governments (Balsmeier et. al., 2004, National White Collar
Crime Center et al. 2004). Gartner estimates that growth in electronic
commerce and online financial services during the next three years alone will
be one to three percentage points lower than if people had improved online
protection. In the 12 months prior to May 2005, within the United States alone,
2.4 million people lost $929 million to Internet fraud (Richmond, 2005). Many
of these on-line consumer frauds are aimed at the uneducated, unaware,
elderly, or immigrants, preying upon the most weak and susceptible of society
(Locovich, 2005; Marlowe and Atiles, 2005). In the past, committing fraud was
more difficult and resulted in paper trails and other physical evidence.
However, today a perpetrator can steal, conceal, and transfer assets with only
the click of a mouse.
Almost daily, new frauds and scams arise using the Internet and other
technological advances as the tools to perpetrate the crimes. Individuals
throughout the world are approached with fraudulent business deals, false
money transfers, and other misleading exchanges in chat rooms, by email, on
Internet pop-ups, or during Internet auctions. It has been suggested that 3 main
areas of fraud exist on the Internet: securities law violations, crime and fraud in
electronic commerce, and deceitful acts by Internet companies or individuals
(Baker, 2002).
Internet fraud perpetrators exert considerable effort in order to influence and
gain power over their faceless victims. An individual in a Internet chat room
who claims to have private information about a public company, citizens of
Nigeria who claim to have access to substantial funds, or illegitimate
companies who con consumers into providing personal financial information
are all examples of perpetrators’ attempts to gain power over unwary victims.
Given the enormous costs of fraud and the growing prevalence of Internet
fraud, the goal of this research is to advance theoretical understanding of the
power that perpetrators use when influencing victims via the Internet.
Specifically, the research proposes an interactive model combining the
dimensions of power and negotiation from the management and psychological
literature and applying it to the fraud process. The article then goes on to
explain the role of the Internet and other technological advances on fraud using
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this model.
It has been suggested that there are two primary methods used to get something
from others illegally: physical force and deception (Albrecht, et. al., 2006).
Fraud is defined as:
A generic term, and embraces all the multifarious means which human
ingenuity can devise, which are resorted to by one individual, to get an
advantage over another by false representation. No definite and invariable
rule can be laid down as a general proposition in defining fraud, as it
includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which another is
cheated. The only boundaries defining it are those, which limit human
knavery (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1964).
2. EXISTING MODELS OF FRAUD
Classic fraud theory explains the motivations for fraud as a triangle of
perceived opportunity, perceived pressure, and rationalization, as shown
below:

Figure 1. Fraud Triangle
The initial contributor to this model was Edwin Sutherland in his 1949 book,
White Collar Crime, for which he is credited with coining the term. According
to Sutherland, white-collar crime is different from street crime in many ways.
It is committed by those of high status and power, it often involves violation by
a trusted person in professions such as medicine, law, accounting, banking and
business, and it is usually committed by individuals who do not see themselves
as criminals. White-collar crime is believed to occur more frequently in large,
rather than small businesses, and the general assumption is that prosecutors and
judges are more lenient on white-collar criminals than on street-level criminals.
One of Sutherland’s most famous students was Donald Cressey who wrote the
book, Other People’s Money (1953). In the studies on which his book is based,
he conducted interviews averaging 15 hours in length with 133 prison inmates
who had been convicted of embezzlement. This book, published in 1953, is an
investigation of the social psychology of the violation of trust, a subject that
Cressey was concerned with throughout his career. By a procedure known as
analytic induction, he developed a general statement about embezzlement
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behavior. Although not claiming predictive power for the theory, he
established three conditions, all of which must be present for the crime to take
place. The persons must have: (1) financial problems defined as non-sharable,
(2) an opportunity to violate trust, (3) rationalization of the act.
Albrecht et al. (1979, 1981) introduced Sutherland’s and Cressey’s work into
the business literature. They concluded that Cressey’s three factors were on
target and labeled them as the fraud triangle. They further concluded that the
three factors worked together interactively so that if more of one factor were
present, less of the other factors needed to exist for fraud to occur. One of the
main limitations of this model is that it only describes the factors that influence
the perpetrator, and does not discuss the relationship between perpetrator and
victim. Nor is the fraud triangle specific to online deception. Rather, it is an allencompassing model to explain the variables involved when someone is
involved in any type of fraud.
Unfortunately, research investigating online deception is limited (Nikitkov and
Stone, 2006). Some of the most common online deception tactics are based on
the Bowyer (1982) and Bell & Whaley (1982, 1991) taxonomy of cheating and
deception. Johnson et al (2001), as well as Grazioli and Jarvenpaa (2000,
2003a, 2003b) have applied the taxonomy to classify the various techniques
employed in Internet deception. In addition, recent research into online
deception has addressed specific types of fraud such as auction fraud (Chua
and Wareham 2004), spoofing (Dinev, 2006), and spamming (Hann et al,
2006). However, much of this recent research lacks any explicit theoretical
explanation, but describes the phenomenon on a surface level. As an exception,
Pavlou and Gefen (2005) examine how online fraud, combined with many
other factors such as trust, institutional structures, trust in community of
sellers, and past buying experience can lead to psychological contract
violations between the buyer and seller and thereby influence purchasing
behavior. Finally, some of the literature from the economics field has
investigated incentives for fraudulent behavior as well as possible changes to
legal structures that would change these incentives (Snyder 2000, Bywell and
Oppenheim 2001).
While prior literature has addressed various aspects of online fraud such as
common deception techniques, we only have a limited theoretical
understanding of the relationship between perpetrator and victim in an online
environment. The Internet presents a unique set of circumstances for
consumers in that it does not provide the normal social or spatial cues that they
typically use to estimate the risk of fraud. Moreover, online fraud is a covert
crime, and society often places less emphasis on the prosecution of these
nonviolent crimes. In addition, Internet frauds tend to be of moderate nominal
amounts to minimize scrutiny, and often cross legal jurisdictions, thereby
reducing the motivation or ability of authorities to prosecute them (Chua and
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Wareham, 2004). As a result of the nature of this relatively novel medium, we
argue for the need for a specific theory that addresses the relationships between
the potential perpetrator and the potential victims of fraud as it is facilitated
through the Internet.
Our paper proceeds by proposing an interactive model, based on French and
Raven’s framework on power, to explain the relationship that takes place
between perpetrator and victim. Online deception is different from other types
of fraud in that it is necessary for the victim to submit to the will of the
perpetrator in order for a perpetrator to be successful. In this sense, a
negotiation must take place. In the following section we discuss negotiation,
its definition, and its role in the process of online deception.
3. DEFINITION OF NEGOTIATION
Negotiation has been defined as “an interpersonal decision-making process by
which two or more people agree how to allocate scarce resources” (Thompson,
2000). Both researchers and practitioners have spent much time and resources
to better understand the negotiation process (Lewicki, et. al., 1999) and its’
various influences, including the negotiators’ bargaining history and its’ effects
on future negotiation performance (O’Conner et. al., 2005). When a fraud
takes place, the fraudulent transaction can be described as a negotiation. In the
fraud setting, the perpetrator and victim make an interpersonal decision to
allocate resources, with the victim transferring resources to the perpetrator
(often for some promised return or false representation). When the fraud takes
place, from both the perpetrators and the victims’ perspectives, a successful
negotiation has taken place. It usually isn’t until some time later that the
victim learns that he or she has been deceived into a fraudulent negotiation.
Proposition 1: When a fraud takes place, the victim believes he or she has
participated in a successful negotiation.
4. DEFINITION OF POWER
Since the process of negotiation and its effect on individuals and transactions
was first introduced into the psychology literature, one of the fundamental
variables that has been studied has been that of power (Marwell et al., 1969).
Power is a critical factor and fundamental element for success in the
negotiation process (Kim et. al., 2005). Weber (1947) introduced power as the
probability that a person can carry out his or her own will despite resistance.
When a fraud takes place, the perpetrator has the desire to carry out his or her
will – taking advantage of the victim through deceit – regardless of resistance.
Most of the power literature since Weber’s time has supported his basic
definition (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). In order to understand power, French
and Raven (1959) introduced a framework that has, arguably, become the most
commonly referenced appraisal with regards to power in the management
literature (Kim et. al, 2005).
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Proposition 2: Understanding the relationship between power and
negotiation in the fraud process can help researchers and practitioners
understand, research, and evaluate fraudulent transactions more fully.
French and Raven (1959) propose that power is comprised of five separate
variables, each stemming from the different aspects of the relationship between
the actor and the actor’s target of influence. It has been said that these five
power bases have stood the test of time (Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003).
Specifically, French and Raven suggest that A’s power over B is determined by
(1) A’s ability to provide benefits to B (reward power), (2) A’s ability to
punish B if B does not comply with A’s wishes (coercive power), (3) A’s
possession of special knowledge or expertise (expert power), (4) A’s legitimate
right to prescribe behavior for B (legitimate power), and (5) the extent to which
B identifies with A (referent power). Using these five definitions it is possible
to divide power into various categories and create five subtypes of power.
Figure 2 presents the five types of power.

Figure 2: Five Types of Power
This model explains the types of power that are used in the relationship
between the actor and the actor’s target of influence. However, recent research
on these types of power in the negotiation process has shown that it is
perceived power, rather than actual power, that affects the outcome of any
given negotiation (Wolfe and McGinn, 2005). Even if A doesn’t actually have
power over B, if B perceives A to have power, then it is as if A truly has power
in the negotiation process. Hence these five types of power can be classified as
perceived reward power, perceived coercive power, perceived expert power,
perceived legitimate power, and perceived referent power. In this paper, we
introduce the idea that, applied to fraud, perceived power is used as a means to
influence the negotiation between the perpetrator and the victim. As can be
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seen above, the perpetrator must deceive the victim into negotiating using one
of the five types of perceived power.
Proposition 3: To fully comprehend the role of power in fraudulent
transactions, it is necessary to interpret the five different types of power as
perceived power.
Perceived reward power is the ability of the perpetrator to convince the victim
that he or she will provide the desired benefits through a negotiation. The
promise of a monetary reward for participation in a Nigerian money scam, the
promise of validation of personal information in a phishing operation, or the
promise of high-paying jobs as a bogus mystery shopper are all examples of
reward power.
Perceived coercive power is the ability of the perpetrator to make the victim
perceive potential punishment if he or she doesn’t participate in the
negotiation. This potential punishment is usually based on fear (Politis, 2005).
If the victim perceives that the perpetrator has the ability to punish him or her
in any way the perpetrator begins to exercise a form of coercive power over
that individual. Perceived coercive power is a tool often used by CEOs, CFOs,
and other executives when a financial statement fraud takes place. Executives
will often use coercive power to influence employees and others to participate
in the fraud. These individuals fear they may lose their jobs, or be
discriminated if they do not participate. Perpetrators can use coercive power,
via the Internet, in at least four ways (1) by gaining personal information about
the victim through spoofing, sniffing, or data theft, (2) through processes such
as click through frauds or other physical fraudulent means, (3) deceiving the
victim to believe that the perpetrator can do physical harm to them, and (4)
persuading the victim that if they do not act now the opportunity will be lost.
Perceived expert power is the ability of the perpetrator to use influence through
means of expertise or knowledge. Examples of frauds that involve perceived
expert power include perpetrators who claim to have access to non-public or
other sensitive information or perpetrators who claim to have a special
knowledge of a given activity. Deceiving a victim into believing that a
perpetrator has expert knowledge or expertise is using expert power to
influence a victim. In one of the most well known frauds of all time, Charles
Ponzi conned victims into believing that he had expert knowledge in foreign
postal coupons. Charles Ponzi claimed that he could make significant profit
for investors by purchasing stamps in Spain for about 1 cent (N.Y. Times,
1920) and selling them in America for six cents. Using this “expert
knowledge” he deceived individuals out of millions of dollars and gave birth to
the popular phrase “Ponzi Scheme.”
Perceived legitimate power is the ability of a perpetrator to convince victims
that he or she has some form of real power over them. Often, this type of fraud
involves individuals claiming to represent the individual’s church, community,
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or organization. The perpetrator assumes some form of authoritative role and
convinces the victim that such authority is legitimate. An example of this type
of fraud is the “Greater Ministries” fraud. Individuals were told to invest
money into programs such as the “Double Your Money” program and the
“Faith Promises Program.” Members of the congregation were promised that
they would double their money in just 17 months. The fraud involved over
18,000 individuals who lost more than $448 million. In 2001, five leaders of
the Greater Ministries International Church were convicted in United States
federal court on a total of 72 counts of conspiracy, wire and mail fraud, and
money laundering (Gibelman and Gelman, 2003).
Perceived reference power is the ability of the perpetrator to relate to the target
of influence. Perpetrators will build relationships of confidence with a victim
via an Internet chat room or other media. Perpetrators often use perceived
reference power to gain confidence from victims and deceive them into fraud.
Perceived reference power is possible because perpetrators characteristics,
unlike other criminals, are very similar to the general population’s
characteristics (Romney, 1980). When fraud does occur, one of the most
common reactions by those around the fraud is denial. Victims can’t believe
that he or she, a trusted friend, would deceive them and behave dishonestly
(Albrecht, 2006).
5. DECEPTION
There are many cases where deception has been used in the negotiation process
(Schweitzer, 1997). Not only is deception a part of many negotiations, but it
has also been suggested that deception increases as the incentives for
performance increase (Tenbrunsal, 1998). Deceitful negotiation has been used
to fraudulently manipulate individuals throughout history. In the negotiation
process it is deception that allows the perpetrator to falsely exercise power over
the victim. The theory of deception identifies seven operational tactics
employed to deceive a victim (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2003b; Johnson et al.
2001). As a primarily tactical model, it compliments our model of power types,
suggesting the specific mechanisms that the con artist may employ to realize
specific power forms over the victim.
For example, research suggests that con-artists pretending to be businesses
prefer masking, and relabeling, thereby achieving expert and legitimate power
(Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2003a). Specifically focused on the Internet, Grazioli
and Jarvenpaa (2000) studied the effectiveness of dazzling, inventing, and
relabeling for disguising fraudulent web sites, often used to achieve reward,
expert and referent power.

36

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(4)
Table 1. Available Tactics in the Theory of Deception
(Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2003b)
Tactic
Masking
Dazzling
Decoying
Mimicking
Inventing
Relabeling
Double play

Definition
Hiding or destroying critical information
Disguising critical information
Distracting the victim’s attention away from critical
information.
Assuming someone else’s identity, or impersonating someone
else.
Making up information.
Presenting information in a misleading way.
Suggesting to the victim that the victim is taking advantage of
the deceiver.

6. POWER AND DECEPTION ON THE INTERNET
Along with the developments in the Internet, opportunities to commit fraud and
unethical acts have become more available. The Internet has created
opportunities to exert perceived power and negotiation skills that were unheard
of 20 years ago. And as technology continues to advance, perpetrators find new
means and ways to deceive individuals and commit fraud.
Proposition 4: The Internet has become a significant, new instrument in
the negotiation process between perpetrators and victims.
According to U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics (2004), the
majority of perpetrators of Internet fraud make contact with the victim through
e-mail (63.5%) or a webpage (23.5%). Internet auction fraud was by far the
most common (71.2%), but in terms of the size of the losses, check fraud
($3,600), Nigerian letter fraud ($3,000), and confidence fraud ($1,000) were
the largest.
It has been suggested that fraud like other crime, can best be explained by three
distinct factors: (1) a supply of motivated offenders, (2) the availability of
suitable targets, and (3) the absence of capable guardians (Cohen and Felson,
1979; Krambia-Kapardis, 2001).
First, the Internet supplies a gathering place for an endless supply of offenders.
The connectivity and global reach provided by the Internet means that these
offenders can be anywhere in the world and through the Internet can
communicate with anyone. Communication through email, the primary method
of contacting victims, is instantaneous and practically free due to low
transaction costs. The Internet also allows offenders the ability to easily
customize their scams to individual users and the flexibility to quickly change
the scam once it is discovered. In auctions alone, Chua and Wareham (2004)
identified 11 different types of fraud, and state that “con artists know that
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developing specialized fraud schemes increases their profits while minimizing
their risk of capture” (p. 33).
Second, the Internet supplies numerous suitable targets. Victims can be
approached through e-mail, chat rooms, pop-up adds, websites and numerous
other media via the Internet. Web sites like eBay, with its 181 million
registered users worldwide, provide offenders with easy access to a large
number of potential victims. However, access to potential victims is not
exclusive to the Internet. Perpetrators of fraud can obtain personal information
in a number of ways, including: stealing wallets, purses or credit cards; stealing
mail or through sending a fraudulent address change form; through viruses or
spyware; or through unsolicited emails or telephone calls, and in over half the
cases the offender has a prior relationship with the victim (Diller-Haas, 2004).
Third, the Internet provides a perfect scenario for fraudulent activity with few
or no capable guardians. The Internet has no boundaries; it crosses
communities, cultures, and countries. Much fraud crosses national and
international legal jurisdictions, and, hence, perpetrators have little risk of
getting caught or punished. For example, while many states within the United
States have statutes relating to cybercrime such as money laundering, identity
theft, online gambling, and cyber stalking, there is no standard and the rules
vary from state to state (Brenner, 2001). Because most of these statutes were
written before the Internet existed, the statutes only relate to property,
computer, or other types of illegal acts and do not specifically address
cybercrime. Fraud is a covert crime, making collection of evidence for
prosecution difficult; it is nonviolent so it receives less evidence by society and
lower priority by law enforcement; most Internet frauds are small and thus
victims have little incentive to prosecute; and when offenders are caught they
often receive light sentences (Chua and Wareham, 2004).
Proposition 5: Fraud is becoming more widespread because the Internet
supplies a gathering place for an endless supply of offenders, offers
numerous suitable targets, and provides a scenario for fraudulent activity
with few or no capable guardians.
7. A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL
To understand the interaction between power, negotiation, and the Internet, the
following model is presented. On the left are French and Raven’s five types of
power. The offender will use the five types of power to deceive the victim into
the negotiation. The middle box represents deception, which is enhanced
through technological advances, such as the Internet, electronic commerce, or
any other technological media used for communication. The right hand box
represents the victim, including the victim’s emotions that the perpetrator will
try to manipulate and use in the deception process. The successful negotiation
is the final outcome of the perpetrator using power to deceive, via the Internet,
the victim by manipulating the victim’s emotions.
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Figure 3. The Cybercrime Framework
In all scams, there is some perceived reward that is never fully realized, or is
misrepresented in some way, whether in the form of money, which never
arrives, or goods or services, which are not provided or are somehow less than
that which was promised. The key to whether the negotiation is successful or
not hinges on the perception on the part of the victim as to the size of the
reward as well as the victim’s perception that the offender is legitimate. The
perceived expert power has a positive relationship with perceived legitimate
power. Furthermore, the perceived referent power is increased through
repeated interactions between offender and victim, and also has a positive
relationship with perceived legitimate power. Coercive power is generally used
to create the impression that the offer is unique and for a limited time, and can
create a sense of urgency in the negotiation.
To illustrate this model, we present the top ten Internet scams of 2005 in Table
2 (Internet Fraud Watch, 2005). In the table, we posit how each type of fraud
appeals to a specific type of power, as well as the predominant deceit tactics
employed to exercise each power.

39

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(4)
Table 2. Internet Crime within the Cybercrime Framework
Perpetrator

Perceived
Reward Power

Perceived
Coercive Power

Perceived
Expert Power

Victim

Desire for a
Reward or
Benefit
• Dazzling
• Decoying
• Mimicking
• Inventing
• Relabeling

Fear of
Punishment

Desire for a
Need or Want

•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Auctions

Seller
misrepresents
product;
Shilling/collusion
artificially
increases price

Auction feverbuyers must act
before auction
close

General
Merchandise

Seller
misrepresents
product

Nigerian Money
Offers

Promise of large
financial rewards

Fake Checks

Victim perceives
that checks are
valid

Lotteries

Promise of large
financial rewards

Offer is for a
limited time

Phishing

Victim expects
validation of
personal
information

Offender argues
that user data
has been stolen
hence possible
injury – updates
required

Advance Fee
Loans

Victim is
promised loan in
spite of his/her
bad credit

Deception via the
Internet

Mimicking
Inventing
Double
play

Offer is
confidential and
for a limited
time
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Decoying
Dazzling
Mimicking
Relabeling

Seller may
pose as expert
in antiques or
one-of-a-kind
merchandise.
Cut and paste
from real
experts
Seller may
pose as expert
in antiques or
one-of-a-kind
merchandise.
Cut and paste
from real
experts

Perceived
Legitimate
Power
Level of
Obedience
•
•
•
•

Decoying
Mimicking
Relabeling
Double
play

Perceived
Referent
Power
Relationship
Needs
•
•
•
•

Dazzling
Mimicking
Inventing
Double
play

Reputation
scores – can
be inflated by
seller
Seller poses as
reputable
company

Trust
relationship
created
through
community
forums

Seller poses as
reputable
company

Seller creates
trust through
interactions
with buyer

Offender
poses as high
government
official –
gives evidence
of legitimacy
Victim
perceives that
offender
represents a
legitimate
company
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution
known to the
victim
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution

Appeals to
needs of
underdeveloped
regions
Offender
creates trust
relationship
through
interactions
with victim
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Table 2 (continued). Internet Crime within the Cybercrime Framework
Information/Adult
Services
Work-at-Home

Internet Access
Services

Victim receives
expected services
but with hidden
conditions
Promise of large
financial rewards

Offender
poses as
expert in
home
businesses

Cost of services
misrepresented
or services not
provided

Offender
poses as a
legitimate
institution
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution

Perceived reward in auctions can be manipulated through various means. The
seller can engage in shilling or bid shielding, where the price of the goods is
artificially driven up through some behavior on the part of the seller. This
creates the impression that the goods are more in demand than they actually
are, resulting in higher bids from “legitimate” buyers. The goods can also be
misrepresented, where the seller describes an item incorrectly and thus the
actual reward is less than what is perceived. Auctions also have a coercive
nature, where the buyers feel that they must act immediately or lose a unique
opportunity.
Perceived expert power can be exercised in auctions, for example, in the case
of goods which are supposedly antiques or one-of-a-kind, and the seller poses
as a knowledgeable collector.
Perceived legitimate power can be created through the reputation scores which
are maintained on auction sites based on the number of situations where the
buyer is satisfied or dissatisfied. These scores can be manipulated through
“phantom” trades where the seller poses as a buyer on various trades and gives
him or herself positive ratings, thus artificially elevating his or her reputation
score.
Finally, perceived referent power can be obtained through reputation scores as
well as other community forums on the auction sites, where buyers and sellers
can interact and perpetrators can gain the confidence of their potential victims.
For each power form, we explore how the Internet enables specific tactics such
as mimicking, inventing, and relabeling. The increased anonymity, global
reach and low barriers to entry of the Internet enable fraudulent activity from
all parts of the world.
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF ON-LINE
FRAUD
The model that has been presented may prove to be of great value to
practitioners, regulators, and academics. Even more importantly, this model
may be of great help in protecting the common individual or consumer from
being defrauded online. As discussed earlier, perpetrators of fraud typically
prey upon the susceptible – the elderly, immigrants, uneducated, or those who
find themselves in a desperate situation.
While the model successfully describes current well-known fraud types, it can
also be used to generate generalized predicative statements concerning future
fraud forms. For example, all of the perpetrator and victim characteristics have
a positive relationship to the possible occurrence of fraud. However, there are a
number of power types and deception methods that are particularly salient to
Internet fraud. While any discussion of future fraud forms is clearly
speculative, it is worth noting that most fraud forms have existed for many
years. The majority of frauds occurring online today have their origins long
before the development of the Internet (Albrecht et al. 2006). Even phishing is
a variant of identity theft that has been practiced for years; the Internet simply
permits a far more efficient execution. Accordingly, table 3 outlines a number
of generalized fraud types, their victim and perpetrator characteristics, primary
deception mechanisms as well as their alignment towards successful execution
on the Internet. While this analysis is a simplification, our assumption is that
future online frauds will likely be novel variants of traditional forms. As such,
we highlight fraud forms that have a high proclivity with the Internet, and
thereby have a higher likelihood of occurring in future forms.
Opportunities for easy money or rewards will likely continue to occur in a
variety of forms on the Internet. The Internet permits a number of techniques
for manipulating or falsifying information to entice victims to send money in
the hopes of future gain. Moreover, the vast reach of the Internet allows
perpetrators to broadcast their lures to a broad audience, and efficiently identify
and communicate with victims with a propensity to fall for the temptation of
easy money.
Likewise, the relative ease with which digital technology can replicate and
manipulate non-existent, stolen or counterfeit products suggests that criminals
will continue to employ these techniques in a variety of ways. In a similar vein,
digital technology and the Internet enable institutional or expert legitimacy to
be easily replicated, thereby permitting criminals to emulate legitimate
scientific, legal or business institutions in a process of selling bogus
pharmaceuticals, or medical, psychiatric, legal or business services.
However, frauds that leverage personal relationships to a high degree will be
less likely. In this situation, we can think of “the power of personal persuasion”
where perpetrators leverage personal or professional relationships to coerce
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victims. While we do not eliminate the possibility, the use of rich
communication media and other social cues to manipulate victims makes these
types of fraud less likely to occur exclusively via the Internet. Rather, the
possibility for hybrid frauds, where the Internet is used for initial contact, and
further negotiation occurs in person, is certainly feasible.
Table 3. Generalized Fraud Types, Their Victim and Perpetrator
Characteristics, Primary Deception Mechanisms as Well as Their Alignment
towards Successful Execution on the Internet
Fraud
Offer for easy
money or rewards
Check or money
transfer scams

Perpetrator
Power
Perceived
reward power
Perceived expert
power
Perceived
legitimate power
Perceived
coercive power

Victim
Desire for
rewards or
benefit
Lack of
knowledge
Level of
obedience
Fear of
punishment

Deception
via Internet
Dazzling
Inventing
Relabeling
Mimicking
Decoying

Merchandise at
“too good to be
true prices”
Counterfeits, stolen
products

Perceived
reward power
Perceived expert
power

Desire for
rewards or
benefit
Lack of
knowledge

Dazzling
Mimicking
Inventing

Fake or illegal
pharmaceuticals or
other medical, legal
or professional
services
Personal cons
Fake loans or
financial
transactions
Fake business
ventures

Perceived expert
power

Lack of
knowledge
Level of
Obedience

Mimicking
Inventing
Relabeling

Perceived
coercive power
Perceived
referent power
Perceived
legitimate power

Fear of
punishment
Level of
obedience
Relationship
needs

Masking
Inventing
Double play

Stealing
confidential
information,
phishing, identity
theft

Perceived
legitimate power
Perceived
referent power

Fear of
punishment
Level of
obedience

Mimicking
Relabeling

Proclivity with Internet
Medium-High
The Internet is well aligned
towards intimate
communication with victim
and manipulation/decoying
of relevant information.
This makes useful for
frauds where the victim is
coerced to send money in
the hopes of obtaining
future rewards.
Very High
The relative ease with
which information and
images can be obtained,
modified and reproduced is
very high, making the
Internet an excellent
medium for this type of
fraud.
Very High
Institutional or expert
legitimacy can be easily
replicated on the Internet
Low
These “personal” frauds are
highly dependent on the
perpetrator’s ability to
leverage personal or
professional power over
victim.
Very High
Institutional or expert
legitimacy is easily
reproduced on the Internet

Finally, techniques for collecting confidential information on victims will
likely continue in tact with the technology that ensures its prevention.

43

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(4)
Computer security experts have long acknowledged that the weakest security
holes in any socio-technical system are not technical, but human. As previously
argued, digital technology enables the relatively easy replication of
institutional legitimacy, thereby enticing obedient victims to divulge
confidential information.
In conclusion, any discussion of future fraud forms on the Internet should
highlight the salient features of the technology that provide a catalyst for fraud.
The Internet has a very broad reach, and perpetrators can efficiently
communicate with a broad group of potential victims and trigger responses that
identify them as susceptible to fraud (e.g. victim characteristics). Secondly,
digital technology permits perpetrators to easily replicate legitimate products,
or services that are in fact, non-existent or counterfeit. This is further enabled
by a similar use of technology to emulate well-know businesses or institutions
to support claims of legitimacy in a variety of fraud forms, be they financial,
counterfeit, or phishing/identity theft frauds.
9. FUTURE RESEARCH
Our model identifies five types of power, the primary tactics utilized to realize
the power, and the common fraud types where these elements are manifest. The
next step in this research is rigorous empirical validation with both aggregate
data analysis as well as controlled experimentation. Understanding the ways in
which perpetrators of fraud are able to exert these five types of power across
the Internet is a first step towards helping regulators, companies and
individuals develop better strategies for its control and prevention.
The strength of this model lies in the fact that it explains the relationship that
takes place between perpetrator and victim, specifically in an online
environment. Moreover, understanding the techniques employed, and how
potential fraud victims self-select themselves in response to these mechanisms
will enable policy makers and consumers to understand the overall process of
online deception and decrease the overall risk of current and future frauds.
Education is the key to preventing fraud. If the model proves accurate with
further testing, consumer protection agencies will have a valuable tool to assist
them in the deterrence of fraud. Furthermore, consumers will be able to
identify potential perpetrators who would try to exploit them using the five
types of power discussed. If consumers can become more aware of their
susceptibility to these types of frauds, they will become more aware of
potential situations where they are susceptible to fraud. In other words, the
model may help identify areas where the probability of on-line fraud occurring
is higher.
The purpose of this paper has been to advance theoretical understanding of the
specific power forms that perpetrators use when influencing victims in
fraudulent transactions. The model has combined the dimensions of power and
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negotiation from the management and psychological literature as well as
Internet fraud research from the Information Systems field. We have examined
the moderating effects of the Internet on the communication and fraud process
between perpetrator and victim, as well as deception tactics employed to
realize each power type in frequently occurring fraud forms.
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